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Is Ignorance Bliss?
A Pennsylvania Employer's Obligation to Provide
Reasonable Accommodation To Employees It
Regards As "Disabled" After Buskirk v. Apollo
Metals, Inc.
Padmaja Chivukula"
On July 26, 1990, Congress passed the Americans with Disabili-
ties Act ("ADA").' The ADA extends the protection in employment
which had been provided to other groups through the Title VII of
the Civil Rights Act of 19642 ("Title VII") and the Age Discrimina-
tion in Employment Act3 ("ADEA") to individuals with a "disabil-
ity." Unlike Title VII and the ADEA,6 however, the ADA's in-
* J.D., 1994 Washington University in St. Louis.
1. 42 U.S.C. § 12101 et. seq. (2003). The Pennsylvania Human Relations Act, 43 Pa.
Cons. Stat. Ann. § 951 et. seq. (2003) is, in all relevant respects, identical to the ADA. The
Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit has noted that "Pennsylvania Courts.. generally
interpret the PHRA in accord with its federal counterparts." Buskirk v. Apollo Metals Inc.,
307 F.3d 160, at n. 1 (3d Cir. 2002) (quoting Rinehimer v. Cemcolift, Inc., 292 F.3d 375, 382
(3d Cir. 2002) (citations and internal quotations omitted)).
2. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e et. seq. (2003). Title VII provides, inter alia,:
(a) It shall be an unlawful employment practice for an employer -
(1) to fail or refuse to hire or to discharge any individual, or otherwise to discriminate
against any individual with respect to his compensation, terms, conditions, or
privileges of employment, because of such individual's race, color, religion, sex, or
national origin; or
(2) to limit, segregate, or classify his employees or applicants for employment in any
way which would deprive or tend to deprive any individual of employment
opportunities or otherwise adversely affect his status as an employee, because of such
individual's race, color, religion, sex, or national origin.
3. 29 U.S.C. § 621 et. seq. (2003). The ADEA provides that:
(a) It shall be unlawful for an employer-
(1) to fail or refuse to hire or to discharge any individual or otherwise discriminate
against any individual with respect to his compensation, terms, conditions, or
privileges of employment, because of such individual's age;
(2) to limit, segregate, or classify his employees in any way which would deprive or
tend to deprive any individual of employment opportunities or otherwise adversely
affect his status as an employee, because of such individual's age; or
(3) to reduce the wage rate of any employee in order to comply with this chapter.
(b) It shall be unlawful for an employment agency to fail or refuse to refer for
employment, or otherwise to discriminate against, any individual because of such
individual's age, or to classify or refer for employment any individual on the basis of
such individual's age.
Id.
4. The ADA provides that:
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tended beneficiaries are not clearly identifiable by objective crite-
ria like their sex, race, color, ancestry, national origin, religion or
birth date. In addition, the ADA, unlike other employment rights
statutes, imposes a duty on employers to modify the workplace as
an accommodation for disabled employees.7 Thus, in a departure
from previous civil rights statutes, which sought to remedy ad-
verse actions, the ADA imposes upon employers an affirmative
duty. Simply put, under the ADA, an employer's failure to provide
an accommodation is discrimination.8
The statutory framework of the ADA has led to some unforeseen
consequences. Specifically, according to the statute, an employee
who has no actual disability is still "disabled" and entitled to pro-
tection under the ADA if the employer "regards" the employee as
disabled.9 Since the statute also provides that "disabled" indi-
viduals are entitled to an accommodation, ° the question becomes
whether employees who are regarded as being disabled are enti-
tled to an accommodation. The Courts of Appeal have struggled
with this issue since the ADA was passed and have reached diver-
gent conclusions.
The Courts of Appeal for the Fifth, Sixth and Eighth Circuits
have held that employees who have no actual disabilities but are
No covered entity shall discriminate against a qualified individual with a disability
because of the disability of such individual in regard to job application procedures,
the hiring, advancement, or discharge of employees, employee compensation, job
training, and other terms, conditions and privileges of employment.
42 U.S.C. § 12112 (a).
5. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e, et. seq. (2003).
6. 29 U.S.C. § 621 et. seq. (2003).
7. The ADA provides that:
(b) Construction. - As used in subsection (a) of this section, the term
"discriminate" includes...
(5) (A) not making reasonable accommodations to the known physical or mental
limitations of an otherwise qualified individual with a disability who is an applicant
or employee, unless such covered entity can demonstrate that the accommodation
would impose an undue hardship on the operation of the business of such covered
entity; or
(B) denying employment opportunities to a job applicant or employee who is an
otherwise qualified individual with a disability, if such denial is based on the need of
such covered entity to make reasonable accommodation to the physical or mental
impairments of the employee or applicant.
42 U.S.C § 12112 (b) (2003).
8. See supra note 7.
9. The ADA defines "disability" as follows: "Disability. - The term "disability" means,
with respect to an individual - (A) a physical or mental impairment that substantially
limits one or more of the major life activities of such individual; (B) a record of such an
impairment; or (C) being regarded as having such an impairment."42 U.S.C. § 12102 (2)
(2003).
10. See supra note 7.
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"regarded as" disabled are not entitled to accommodations." In
contrast, the Court of Appeals for the First Circuit has held that
"regarded as" employees are entitled to accommodation. 12
On September 20, 2002, the Court of Appeals for the Third Cir-
cuit issued its decision in Buskirk v. Apollo Metals.13 In Buskirk,
the Court of Appeals again addressed whether the ADA 4 and the
Pennsylvania Human Relations Act (PHRA)" require a Pennsyl-
vania employer to provide a reasonable accommodation to an em-
ployee who does not suffer from an actual disability but who the
employer regards as disabled. 6 The Court of Appeals declined to
resolve the issue, holding instead that the employer had provided
a reasonable accommodation to the employee and thus had not
violated the ADA. 7
The Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit, while not resolving
the issue, has, nonetheless, provided extensive analysis thereof.
This article examines the evolving standards articulated by the
Court of Appeals in order to attempt to provide some guidance as
to the responsibilities of Pennsylvania employers and the rights of
Pennsylvania employees under the "regarded as" disabled prong of
the ADA and the Pennsylvania Human Relations Act after
Buskirk.
In Section I, this article examines the statutory framework of
the ADA including an analysis of the statutory precursor to the
ADA, the Rehabilitation Act of 1973 ("Rehabilitation Act"). 8 Sec-
tion I further examines the regulations promulgated by the Equal
Employment Opportunity Commission ("EEOC") and the Supreme
Court's analysis of the "regarded as" prong in Sutton v. United
Airlines. '9
11. Weber v. Strippit, Inc., 186 F.3d 907, 916-17 (8th Cir. 1999), cert. denied, 528 U.S.
1078 (2000); Workman v. Frit-Lay, Inc., 165 F.3d 460, 467 (6th Cir. 1999); Newberry v. E.
Tex. State Univ., 161 F.3d 276, 280 (5th Cir. 1998).
12. Katz v. City Metal Co., 87 F.3d 26 (1st Cir. 1996). See also Jacques v. DiMarzio,
Inc., 216 F.Supp.2d 139 (E.D.N.Y. 2002)(denying employers motion for summary judgment
on the basis that a genuine issue of material fact existed as to whether defendant perceived
plaintiff as substantially limited in a major life activity and denied an accommodation thus
violating the ADA).
13. 307 F.3d 160 (3d Cir. 2002).
14. 42 U.S.C. § 12101 et. seq. (2003).
15. 43 PA.CONS.STAT. § 951 et. seq.(2003).
16. Buskirk, 307 F.3d at 162.
17. Id. at 168.
18. 29 U.S.C. § 794 (2003).
19. 527 U.S. 471 (1999).
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Section II reviews the decisions issued by the Court of Appeals
for the Third Circuit. Section III attempts to provide some guid-
ance for Pennsylvania employers and employees and concludes
that the Court of Appeals should hold that, in order to give effect
to Congressional intent and common sense, employees who are
"regarded as" disabled are not entitled to accommodation under
the ADA.
I. STATUTORY FRAMEWORK
A. The Rehabilitation Act and Arline
Congress first codified the "regarded as" framework in the Re-
habilitation Act."° The Rehabilitation Act provides that no "quali-
fied handicapped individual" will be excluded from participation in
any program receiving federal financial assistance. The Rehabili-
tation Act defines a "handicapped individual" as any person who:
"(1) has a physical or mental impairment which substantially lim-
its one or more major life activities; (2) has a record of such im-
pairment; or (3) is regarded as having such an impairment."
21
In School Board of Nassau County v. Arline,22 the Supreme
Court interpreted the "regarded as" prong of the Rehabilitation
Act. In Arline the plaintiff was a school teacher who had con-
tracted tuberculosis.23 The disease went into remission for several
24years. In 1977 and thereafter, the plaintiff had two relapses for
which she was hospitalized.25 After her third relapse her em-
ployer, the School Board of Nassau County, ("School Board") ter-
minated her employment.26 The School Board advised her that she
was terminated not because of "anything she did wrong" but be-
cause of the recurrence of her tuberculosis.27 The plaintiff filed
suit alleging that, by firing her, School Board violated the Reha-
bilitation Act. 28  The plaintiff contended that the School Board
terminated her because of her record of handicap and because
20. School Board of Nassau County v. Arline, 480 U.S. 273, 282 (1987) (quoting 29
U.S.C. § 794 (which has since been amended)).
21. Arline, 480 U.S. at 279 (quoting 29 U.S.C. § 706(7) (which has since been
amended)).
22. 480 U.S. 273 (1987).








they regarded her as having a handicap.29 The Supreme Court
agreed." The Court concluded that the plaintiff was a handi-
capped individual because of both her record of impairment and
because her employer regarded her as having an impairment.'
The Supreme Court stated in the "regarded as" section of the Re-
habilitation Act: "Congress acknowledged that society's accumu-
lated myths and fears about disability and diseases are as handi-
capping as are the physical limitations that flow from actual im-
pairment."32
In light of its conclusion that Arline was "handicapped" under
the Rehabilitation Act, the Court then turned to the question of:
whether Arline is otherwise qualified for the job of elementary
school teacher. To answer this question in most cases, the
district court will need to conduct an individualized inquiry
and make appropriate findings of fact. Such an inquiry is es-
sential if 504 is to achieve its goal of protecting handicapped
individuals from deprivations based on prejudice, stereotypes,
or unfounded fear, while giving appropriate weight to such le-
gitimate concerns of grantees as avoiding exposing others to
significant health and safety risks. The basic factors to be
considered are well established ....
The Court then stated that the "next step in the 'otherwise
qualified' inquiry is for the court to evaluate, in light of these
medical findings, whether the employer could reasonably accom-
modate the employee under the established standards for that
inquiry".34
It is important to note that, in Arline, the plaintiff did not re-
quest an accommodation from the School Board. Rather, the
School Board fired her upon learning of her relapse. The sole
question in Arline was, therefore, whether, by terminating her
because of its fears regarding tuberculosis, the School Board's ac-
tions violated the Rehabilitation Act.35 The Supreme Court's ref-
erence to "accommodation" in light of the "medical findings" di-
rected the lower court to evaluate the threat, if any, plaintiffs tu-
29. Id.
30. Id. at 277.
31. Id. at 285.
32. Arline, 480 U.S. at 284.
33. Id. at 287.




berculosis posed to the school population.36 If the School Board's
fears regarding the dangers of tuberculosis were found to be valid,
the plaintiffs termination would not violate the Rehabilitation
Act, and if their fears were invalid, termination would violate the
Rehabilitation Act. The only "accommodation" which would have
been required upon reinstating the plaintiff was a modification of
the School Board's attitude.
B. ADA Definitions
The ADA provides that: "No covered entity shall discriminate
against a qualified individual with a disability because of the dis-
ability of such individual in regard to job application procedures,
the hiring, advancement, or discharge of employees, employee
compensation, job training, and other terms, conditions and privi-
leges of employment." 7 The ADA defines "disability" as: "(A) a
physical or mental impairment that substantially limits one or
more of the major life activities of such individual; (B) a record of
such impairment; or (C) being regarded as having such impair-
ment."38 "Impairment is any physiological disorder, cosmetic dis-
figurement, or anatomical loss affecting one of the body's systems
or any mental disorder."39 A "qualified individual with a disabil-
ity" is an:
individual with a disability who, with or without reasonable
accommodation, can perform the essential functions of the
employment position that such individual holds or desires.
For the purposes of this subchapter, consideration shall be
given to the employer's judgment as to what functions of a job
are essential, and if an employer has prepared a written
description before advertising or interviewing applicants for
the job, this description shall be considered evidence of the
essential functions of the job.4"
A reasonable accommodation is defined as including, but not
limited to, the following:
36. Id.
37. 42 U.S.C. § 12112 (a) (2003).
38. 42 U.S.C. § 12102(2); 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(g).
39. 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(h).
40. 42 U.S.C. § 12111(8) (2003).
Vol. 41546
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(A) making existing facilities used by employees readily
accessible to and usable by individuals with disabilities; and
(B) job restructuring, part-time or modified work schedules,
reassignment to a vacant position, acquisition or modification
of equipment or devices, appropriate adjustment or
modifications of examinations, training materials or policies,
the provision of qualified readers or interpreters, and other
similar accommodations for individuals with disabilities.41
The ADA further provides that an accomodation is not
reasonable if it poses an "undue hardship." 2 The Supreme Court
recently held that an accommodation that would run afoul of the
employer's seniority rules is generally an "undue hardship" and,
therefore, not reasonable.43
The statute also provides a number of defenses. Specifically,
the ADA authorizes employers to utilize "qualification standards"
which are job related and consistent with business necessity
provided there is no reasonable accommodation of the
qualification standard which would allow the individual to
perform the job.44 These qualification standards can include a
41. 42 U.S.C. § 12111(9) (2003).
42. The ADA defines an "undue hardship" as:
(A) In general. - The term "undue hardship" means an action requiring significant
difficulty or expense, when considered in light of the factors set forth in
subparagraph (B).
(B) Factors to be considered. - In determining whether an accommodation would
impose an undue hardship on a covered entity, factors to be considered include-
(i) the nature and cost of the accommodation needed under this chapter;
(ii) the overall financial resources of the facility or facilities involved in the provision
of the reasonable accommodation; the number of persons employed at such facility;
the effect on expenses and resources, or the impact otherwise of such accommodation
upon the operation of the facility;
(iii) the overall financial resources of the covered entity; the overall size of the
business of a covered entity with respect to the number of its employees; the number,
type, and location of its facilities; and
(iv) the type of operation or operations of the covered entity, including the
composition, structure, and functions of the workforce of such entity; the geographic
separateness, administrative, or fiscal relationship of the facility or facilities in
question to the covered entity.
42 U.S.C. § 12111(10) (2003).
43. US Airways v. Barnett, 535 U.S. 391 (2002).
44. 42 U.S.C. §12113(a). The ADA states:
(a) In general. - It may be a defense to a charge of discrimination under this chapter
that an alleged application of qualification standards, tests, or selection criteria that
screen out or tend to screen out or otherwise deny a job or benefit to an individual
with a disability has been shown to be jobrelated and consistent with business
necessity, and such performance cannot be accomplished by reasonable
accommodation, as required under this subchapter.
547
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requirement that the individual not pose a direct threat to the
health and safety of themselves 4 or others.46  In addition, an
employer who can show that it attempted in good faith to provide
a reasonable accommodation will not be liable for compensatory or
punitive damages.47
C. The EEOC Regulations
Under the ADA, Congress granted the EEOC the authority to
promulgate regulations to carry out the employment provi-
sions in Title J.4'  The Supreme Court has stated, without
deciding, that the EEOC does not have the authority to issue
regulations defining the term "disability." The Court has not
definitively held what deference, if any, is due the EEOC
regulations on this point.49 The regulations do, however,
provide the EEOC's position and are, as the statements of
the agency charged with enforcing the ADA, somewhat per-
suasive.
The EEOC regulations provide an individual is "regarded as"
being disabled if he or she:
(1) has a physical or mental impairment that does not sub-
stantially limit major life activities but is treated by a covered
entity as constituting such a limitation;
Id.
45. Chevron U.S.A. v. Echazabal, 536 U.S. 73 (2002).
46. 42 U.S.C. § 12113(b). The ADA states: (b) "Qualification standards. -The term
"qualification standards" may include a requirement that an individual shall not pose a
direct threat to the health or safety of other individuals in the workplace." Id.
47. 42 U.S.C. § 1981a(a)(3) provides:
Reasonable Accommodation and Good Faith Effort. - In cases where a discriminatory
practice involves the provision of a reasonable accommodation pursuant to section
102(b)(5) of the Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990 or regulations implementing
section 501 of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, damages may not be awarded under
this section where the covered entity demonstrates good faith efforts, in consultation
with the person with the disability who has informed the covered entity that
accommodation is needed, to identify and make a reasonable accommodation that
would provide such individual with an equally effective opportunity and would not
cause an undue hardship on the operation of the business.
Id.
48. 42 U.S.C. § 12116 (2003).
49. Sutton v. United Airlines, 527 U.S. 471, 479 (1999).
Vol. 41548
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(2) has a physical or mental impairment that substantially
limits major life activities only as a result of the attitude of
others toward such impairment;
(3) has none of the impairments defined in paragraph h(1) or
h(2) of this section but is treated by a covered entity as having
a substantially limiting impairment."
The EEOC has issued regulations which provide guidance in de-
termining whether an individual's impairment "substantially lim-
its one or more major life activities."5 According to the EEOC,
"major life activities" include "functions such as caring for oneself,
performing manual tasks, walking, seeing, hearing, speaking,
breathing, learning, and working." 2 The regulations provide that
"substantially limited" means:
(i) Unable to perform a major life activity that the average
person in the general population can perform; or
(ii) Significantly restricted as to the condition, manner or
duration under which an individual can perform a particular
major life activity as compared to the condition, manner or
duration under which the average person in the general popu-
lation can perform the same major life activity."
The EEOC provided examples to illustrate employees who, it be-
lieved, would establish that their employer "regarded" them as
disabled.54 According to the EEOC, an employee who suffered
"strabismus" or crossed eyes and is perceived, incorrectly, by their
employer as being unable to see and, therefore, disqualified from a
supervisory position would satisfy the first definition of "regarded
as" disabled.55 The EEOC explains that the employee, though suf-
fering from no actual impairment, is nonetheless disabled by the
employer's biases.56 Further, an employee who has a facial scar,
which the EEOC considers an impairment, and is rejected from a
job as a sales person due to the employer's belief that the scar
50. 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(1).
51. 29 C.F.R. §§ 1630.2(h)-(j).
52. 29 C.F.R. § 1630(2)(i).
53. 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(j)(1).
54. See EEOC Enforcement Guidance, Section 902: Definition of the Term "Disability"





would shock and repel customers satisfies the second definition of
"regarded as" disabled.57 The EEOC reasons that the employee
has an impairment that would not be substantially limiting in a
major life activity but for the employer's negative attitudes. 8 Fi-
nally, an individual who is rejected from employment because the
employer incorrectly concludes that the employee suffers from the
Human Immunodeficiency Virus satisfies the third definition of
"regarded as" disabled. 9 The EEOC argues that the applicant for
employment, who suffers no impairment, is "disabled" under the
ADA due to the employer's treatment of that individual.6"
The EEOC also issued "Interpretative Guidance on Title I of the
Americans With Disabilities Act" soon after the Act was passed."
In the guidance, the EEOC opined that Congress incorporated the
"regarded as" definition of disability in light of the Supreme
Court's decision in Arline.62
Thus the EEOC concluded that:
if an individual can show that an employer or other covered
entity made an employment decision because of a perception
of disability based on "myth, fear or stereotype," the individ-
ual will satisfy the "regarded as" part of the definition of dis-
ability. If the employer cannot articulate a legitimate non-
discriminatory reason for the employment action, an inference
that the employer is acting on the basis of "myth, fear or
stereotype" can be drawn.63
It is significant to note that none of the examples provided by
the EEOC address the issue of reasonable accommodation.
Rather, the EEOC is primarily concerned with those scenarios in
which the employer acts unilaterally on the basis of its own biases.
In these cases the only "accommodation" that would be required
would be the education of the employer and reinstatement of the
employee.
57. Id.
58. Id. The EEOC recently filed suit in Alabama against McDonald's Corporation on
behalf of an employee who has a severe port wine stain which covers her entire face alleg-
ing that McDonald's refused to promote her to manager on the basis of its erroneous per-
ception of her condition as substantially disabling. Id.
59. EEOC Enforcement Guidance, supra note 54.
60. Id.
61. 29 C.F.R. Part 1630 Appendix I.




D. Sutton v. United Airlines'
In Sutton v. United Airlines, the Supreme Court addressed, in-
ter alia, the "regarded as" portion of the definition of disability."5
In Sutton, twin sisters who suffered from severe myopia applied
for jobs as airline pilots with United Airlines." Uncorrected, the
sisters' vision was 20/400 or worse. 7 With correction, the sisters
both had vision within the normal range. 8 Based upon a United
Airlines policy prohibiting individuals with myopia from becoming
airline pilots, their applications for employment were rejected.69
They filed suit alleging that United Airlines discriminated against
them because of their disability, myopia, and/or because United
Airlines incorrectly regarded them as disabled because of their
myopia.7" United Airlines moved, under Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(6), to
dismiss the case for failure to state a claim upon which relief could
be granted.7" The District Court granted the motion and the Court
of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit affirmed.72 The Suttons ap-
pealed.73
The Supreme Court held that the Suttons physical condition
must be evaluated with reference to their corrected vision.74 Since,
with glasses, both Suttons had normal vision, the Supreme Court
held that they were not disabled within the meaning of the ADA.75
The Supreme Court then considered whether the Suttons had
stated a claim that United Airlines unlawfully regarded them as
disabled.6
The Supreme Court stated that:
There are two apparent ways in which individuals may fall
within [the statutory definition of "regarded as disabled"]: (1)
a covered entity mistakenly believes that a person has a
physical impairment that substantially limits one or more
major life activities, or (2) a covered entity mistakenly be-
64. 527 U.S. 471 (1999).
65. Id. at 489-494.
66. Id. at 475.
67. Id.
68. Id.





74. Sutton, 527 U.S. at 477.
75. Id. at 477-89.
76. Id. at 489.
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lieves that an actual, nonlimiting impairment substantially
limits one or more major life activities. In both cases, it is
necessary that a covered entity entertain misperceptions
about the individual-it must believe either that one has a
substantially limiting impairment one does not have or that
one has a substantially limiting impairment when in fact the
impairment is not so limiting.7
The Supreme Court expressed doubt with regard to the author-
ity of the EEOC to issue definitional regulations" and, in fact,
abandoned the definitions set forth in the regulations in favor of
its own formulation which combined the first and second prongs of
the EEOC's definition and paraphrased the third.79 The Court
then analyzed the Suttons' claim that, because of their vision,
United Airlines regarded them as substantially impaired in the
major life activity of working. 0 The Court noted that, since the
parties had not disputed the EEOC's regulations, it would assume,
without deciding, that the EEOC regulations were reasonable.81
Pursuant to the regulations, the Court concluded that:
[t]o be substantially limited in the major life activity of work-
ing, then, one must be precluded from more than one type of
job, a specialized job, or a particular job of choice. If jobs util-
izing an individual's skills (but perhaps not his or her unique
talents) are available, one is not precluded from a substantial
class of jobs. Similarly, if a host of different types of jobs are
available, one is not precluded from a broad range of jobs.82
The Court held that the Suttons' allegations were insufficient to
establish that United Airlines viewed them as incapable of per-
forming any job other than global airline pilot.83 Thus, the Court
held that the Suttons had failed to establish that United Airlines
77. Id.
78. Id. at 479. The Court noted that "[n]o agency, however, has been given authority to
issue regulations implementing the generally applicable provisions of the ADA, see §§
12101-12102, which fall outside Titles I-V. Most notably, no agency has been delegated
authority to interpret the term "disability" § 12102(2)." Id.
79. See supra section I.C.
80. Sutton, 527 U.S. at 490. The Court noted that the petitioners had not made "the
obvious argument that they are regarded due to their impairments as substantially limited
in the major life activity of seeing." Id.
81. Id. at 492.
82. Id.
83. Id. at 493.
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regarded them as substantially impaired in a broad range of jobs.'
Accordingly, the Court affirmed the lower court's dismissal of the
Suttons' claims that United Airlines regarded them as disabled.85
The Suttons did not ask United Airlines for an accommodation.
Rather, they asked United Airlines to hire them despite their vi-
sion problems.86 Had the Suttons prevailed, United Airlines would
have been required to modify its vision policy and hire them. No
further accommodations would have been required.
II. STATUS OF THE LAW IN PENNSYLVANIA
The Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit has issued several
opinions in the last few years which have raised the issue of
whether accommodations are required for employees who are re-
garded as disabled. Although the Court of Appeals has held, in
each instance, that the issue was not properly before it, the Court
of Appeals has, nonetheless, provided substantial guidance to
Pennsylvania employers and employees attempting, in good faith,
to comply with the ADA.
A. Deane v. Pocono Medical Center
In Deane v. Pocono Medical Center,87 the Court of Appeals for
the Third Circuit first identified, but failed to decide, the issue of
whether or not a "regarded as" employee was entitled to an ac-
commodation. In Deane the defendant, Pocono Medical Center
("PMC") refused to allow plaintiff Stacy L. Deane ("Deane") to re-
turn to her position as a registered nurse after she suffered a work
related injury." PMC determined, after Deane advised them of
her intent to return to work and her restrictions, that Deane could
not perform her previous job and that there were no other jobs
available for which she was qualified." Deane then filed suit in
the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Penn-
sylvania alleging that PMC violated the ADA by terminating her
either because of her actual disability or because of PMC's inaccu-
rate perception of the severity of her impairment.' The district
84. Id.
85. Id. at 494.
86. Id. at 475.
87. 142 F.3d 138 (3d cir. 1998) (en banc).
88. Id. at 140.
89. Id. at 141.
90. Id. at 144.
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court concluded that Deane was not actually disabled.91 The dis-
trict court also granted PMC's motion for summary judgment of
Deane's claims that PMC regarded her as disabled on the basis
that:
(1) PMC regarded Deane's impairment as limiting only her
ability to work as a nurse on the surgical/medical floor, not
her ability to work as a nurse in general; (2) Deane could not
have been generally precluded from working in her field be-
cause, following her termination from PMC, she held two po-
sitions as a nurse; and (3) PMC's perception of Deane's im-
pairment was not motivated by myth, fear or stereotype and,
therefore was not actionable under the ADA. 2
On appeal, an en banc court reversed.93 The Court of Appeals
held that there was a genuine issue of material fact as to whether
PMC regarded Deane as disabled.9" First, with regard to the dis-
trict court's conclusion that only those employer perceptions which
are based upon myths, fears or stereotypes are actionable, the
court stated:
Although the legislative history indicates that Congress was
concerned about eliminating society's myths, fears, stereo-
types, and prejudices with respect to the disabled, the EEOC
Regulations ... make clear that even an innocent mispercep-
tion based on nothing more than a simple mistake of fact as to
the severity, or even the very existence, of an individual's im-
pairment can be sufficient to satisfy the statutory definition of
a perceived disability.. .thus whether or not PMC was moti-
vated by myth, fear or prejudice is not determinative of
Deane's regarded as claim.9"
The Court of Appeals then dismissed the district court's reliance
on Deane's subsequent employment by noting that her ability to
perform as a nurse was not in question.96 Rather, the question
was solely whether PMC incorrectly perceived her to be incapable
of working as a nurse.9" With regard to the final point, the court
91. Id.
92. Deane, 142 F.3d at 144.
93. Id.
94. Id.
95. Id. at 144-45.
96. Id.
97. Deane, 143 F.3d at 144.
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stated that there was "sufficient evidence to create a genuine issue
of material fact as to whether PMC regarded [Deane] as substan-
tially limited in the major life activity of working."98 This evidence
included PMC officials attesting to "confusion as to the extent of
Deane's physical capacity ... [and] evidence that PMC fundamen-
tally misunderstood and exaggerated the limitations that the
wrist injury imposed on Deane."99 There was also evidence that
"PMC did not evaluate Deane, contact her physician or independ-
ently review her medical records." °°
With regard to whether Deane was a "qualified individual with
a disability," the court analyzed whether Deane could perform the
essential functions of the job, with or without accommodation.'
In this connection, the court examined the conflicting evidence
with regard to whether heavy lifting was an essential function of
Deane's job as a nurse."' The court concluded that there was a
genuine issue of material fact as to whether lifting was an essen-
tial function.' Thus the Court of Appeals reversed and remanded
for trial.
0 4
The majority opinion does not address whether a "regarded as"
employee is entitled to an accommodation. In the majority's view,
if lifting was not an essential function of Deane's job, then Deane
would not be entitled to an accommodation of her lifting restric-
tion.' 5 The court stated that: "In view of this conclusion, we need
not reach the more difficult question addressed by the panel
whether 'regarded as' disabled plaintiffs must be accommodated
by their employers if they cannot perform the essential functions
of their jobs."' 6 In a footnote the court provided, however, an ex-
tensive analysis of the arguments of both sides on this issue. With
regard to Deane's position the court noted that Deane purported
"that, as a matter of statutory interpretation, 'regarded as' plain-
tiffs are entitled to the same reasonable accommodations from
their employers as are actually disabled plaintiffs." Deane
claimed that this contention was supported by the Arline deci-
98. Id.
99. Id.
100. Id. at 145.
101. Id. at 145.
102. Id. at 147.
103. Id.
104. Deane, 143 F.3d at 147.




sion."°7 Deane further alleged that if reasonable accommodations
are not provided for "regarded as" plaintiffs, the ADA would be
ineffective in its purpose of "ferreting out disability discrimination
in employment."08 "This is because, following Deane's logic, the
regarded as prong of the disability definition is premised upon the
reality that the perception of disability, socially constructed and
reinforced, is difficult to destroy, and in most cases, merely in-
forming the employer of its misperception will not be enough."10 9
The court summarized PMC's position, noting that "PMC ini-
tially stated that a 'regarded as' plaintiffs only disability is the
employer's irrational response to her illusory condition."1 ° Thus
there was no reason to reach any accommodations. PMC further
stated that if Deane's interpretation of the ADA were to be
adopted, both healthy employees and "legitimate 'regarded as'"
employees could require employers to provide accommodations for
them that were not provided for "similarly situation coworkers.""'
The court, while not directly deciding the issue, concluded that:
acknowledge[d] the considerable force of PMC's argument,
[but took] no position on the accommodation issue, and note
that the EEOC has not taken an official position yet ei-
ther... [The court] note[d], however, that if it turns out that a
"regarded as" plaintiff who cannot perform the essential func-
tions of her job is not entitled to accommodation (and there-
fore does not have to be reinstated), he or she need not neces-
sarily be without remedy. The plaintiff still might be entitled
to injunctive relief against future discrimination.. .to compen-
satory or punitive damages under 42 U.S.C. § 1981(a).. .and/or
counsel fees under 42 U.S.C. § 1988(b). 2
In its conclusion, the court implied that PMC's true error was
not necessarily failing to accommodate Deane, but rather in fail-
ing to expend more effort in determining whether Deane was enti-
tled to an accommodation." 3 In the last line of the opinion the
court stated that:
107. School Board of Nassau County v. Arline, 480 U.S. 273 (1987). See discussion su-
pra, section I.A.
108. Deane, 143 F.3d at 148, n.12.
109. Id.
110. Id. at 149, n.12.
111. Id.
112. Id.
113. Deane, 142 F.3d at 149.
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[w]hile it may turn out that a reasonable accommodation for
Deane is impossible (or is not required because she is a "re-
garded as" plaintiff), nevertheless, an employer who fails to
engage in the interactive process runs a serious risk that it
will erroneously overlook an opportunity to accommodate a
statutorily disabled employee and thereby violate the ADA."'
The Honorable Morton I. Greenberg, in his dissent, concluded
that "this case is quite straightforward but somehow has become
complicated.""5 The dissent noted that the issue presented by the
case was simply "whether a person who is not actually disabled
can demand a reasonable accommodation from an employer." 116
The dissent stated that "Congress did not pass the ADA to permit
persons without a disability to demand accommodation."" 7 In the
dissent's view, it was critical that Deane asked for an accommoda-
tion."8 This was not, as the dissent stated, "a case in which the
employer perceived the employee to be disabled and then refused
to make the accommodation which it believed she needed."119
Rather, this was a case where PMC acted, not on its misperception
of Deane's condition, but on Deane's own characterization of her
condition.2 ° Thus, "even if PMC regarded her as more disabled
than she actually was, this misperception does not matter for she
is not entitled to any accommodation." 121
B. Taylor v. Pathmark122
A year after the Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit con-
cluded PMC did too little to determine the extent of its employee's
impairment, it determined that Pathmark Stores perhaps did too
much. In Taylor v. Pathmark.3 the court reaffirmed that:
To successfully claim that he was wrongly regarded as dis-
abled from working, a plaintiff need not be the victim of neg-
ligence or malice; an employer's innocent mistake (which may
114. Id. (quoting Megine v. Runyon, 114 F.3d 415, 420-421 (3d Cir. 1997)).





120. Deane, 142 F.3d at 150 (Greenberg, J. Dissenting).
121. Id.
122. Taylor v. Pathmark Stores, Inc., 177 F.3d 180 (3d Cir. 1999).
123. Id. at 182.
557Spring 2003
Duquesne Law Review
be a function of "goofs" or miscommunications) is sufficient to
subject it to liability under the ADA... although the employer's
state of mind is clearly relevant to the appropriate reme-
dies.'24
The court recognized, however, "a limited defense of reasonable
mistake where the employee is responsible for the employer's er-
roneous perception and the employer's perception is not based on
stereotypes about disability."
125
In Taylor, defendant Pathmark Stores, Inc. ("Pathmark") hired
the plaintiff Joseph B. Taylor ("Taylor") in 1981.126 In December of
1991, while working as a Frozen Foods Manager, Taylor slipped
and sprained his right ankle."7  Thereafter, in January 1992,
plaintiff aggravated his injury when he fell down a flight of
stairs. 128 He did not return to work until November of 1992.129 At
that time, Pathmark advised Taylor that his previous position had
been filled.13 ' Pathmark provided Taylor with a number of light
duty positions as an accommodation from November of 1992 until
April of 1994.1" At this juncture, Taylor's manager asked him to
provide an updated doctor's note detailing his restrictions."' Tay-
lor provided the requested note from his family physician."' Con-
temporaneously, for reasons that are unclear, Pathmark's corpo-
rate office requested an update on Taylor's condition from Taylor's
orthopedic surgeon.14 This doctor opined that, since he had not
seen Taylor in several months, his condition must have im-
proved."'
Based upon the note from the orthopedic surgeon, Taylor's
manager required him to work a full shift at the cash register.
1 6
Taylor did not feel he could do so without a stool or breaks and left
the building."7 Thereafter, Taylor was made aware of the incon-
124. Id.
125. Id.
126. Id. at 183.










137. Taylor, 177 F.3d at 183.
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sistent medical information regarding his condition and sought a
new evaluation from the orthopedic surgeon who, after examining
Taylor, agreed that he continued to have restrictions and work
limitations.'38 In addition to this information, Pathmark required
Taylor to be examined by another doctor in September of 1994.139
This doctor, an orthopeadic surgeon, advised Pathmark's counsel
that Taylor could work with restrictions.4 ' Pathmark did not re-
turn Taylor to work and took no action for another year. 4' There-
after, in September of 1995, Pathmark's ADA committee sent Tay-
lor's family doctor a questionnaire regarding Taylor's restric-
tions., 2 The doctor advised Pathmark that Taylor was suffering
from an aggravation of his ankle injury and was temporarily sub-
ject to increased work restrictions." Taylor advised Pathmark in
December of 1995 that these temporary restrictions had been
lifted and he was released to return to work under the limitations
he had prior to April of 1994. TM Pathmark terminated Taylor due
to his inability to work by letter dated May 13, 1996.145 Upon re-
ceipt of this letter, Taylor asked that his family doctor advise
Pathmark of his improved condition. 14  His physician did so in
June of 1996.141 Pathmark did not reinstate Taylor, despite the
fact that it realized that its decision to terminate Taylor on the
basis of his physical condition was mistaken.4 ' Taylor then
brought suit alleging that Pathmark discriminated against him on
the basis of his disability or, in the alternative, that Pathmark
wrongly regarded him as disabled. 149 "After Taylor had presented
his evidence at trial, the district court granted summary judgment
to Pathmark.""' Taylor appealed. The Court of Appeals affirmed
the district court's conclusion that Taylor was not actually dis-
abled.' The Court of Appeals reversed the district court's conclu-









147. Taylor, 177 F.3d. at 184.
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sion that Pathmark did not regard Taylor as disabled and re-
manded for a new trial.
152
The appeals court concluded that Pathmark may have violated
the ADA as a result of its mistaken perception of his actual condi-
tion.5 3 Reasoning that since the employer's mistake resulted, at
least in part, from the incorrect information provided to it by an
agent of the employee, the court found that liability may be
avoided.5 The court did not address the question of whether ac-
commodation would have been required, reserving that question
for the district court.
Significantly, the court announced a new "limited reasonability
defense." The court noted that:
Deane announced our conclusion that employer mistakes can
lead to "regarded as" liability. The question then becomes:
what limits, if any, are there to this principle? There are no
clear answers in our precedent, the statute, the legislative
history or the EEOC's interpretive guidelines. We must,
however, answer the question to resolve this case. We believe
that guidance can be found in the general logic of the ADA,
which requires an interactive relationship between the em-
ployer and employee and concomitantly requires an individual
evaluation of employees' impairments.
While prejudice is not required, we recognize that the ADA
has as a major purpose the protection of individuals who are
subject to stereotypes about their abilities. An employer who
regards a kind of impairment-epilepsy for example-as dis-
qualifying all people affected by the impairment for a wide
range of jobs is thus not entitled to a defense of reasonable
mistake; under the ADA, it is the employer's burden to edu-
cate itself about the varying nature of impairments and to
make individualized determinations about affected employ-
155ees.
The court concluded that:
The limited exception to liability for mistakes can be ex-
pressed as follows: If an employer regards plaintiff as dis-
152. Taylor, 177 F.3d. at 192.
153. Id.




abled based on a mistake in an individualized determination
of the employee's actual condition rather than on a belief
about the effects of the kind of impairment the employer re-
garded the employee as having, then the employer will have a
defense if the employee unreasonably failed to inform the em-
ployer of the actual situation.1
6
Put another way, if an employer acted on myths, fears and
stereotypes, there would be an ADA violation and no limited rea-
sonability defense. In this instance, the employer would essen-
tially view the employee as disabled and refuse to provide an ac-
commodation. The court could have additionally noted that addi-
tional support for the "limited reasonability defense" could be
found in the ADA's elimination of compensatory and punitive
damages for employers who attempt, in good faith, to provide a
reasonable accommodation.'57 Additional support for the "limited
reasonability defense" is also found in ADA's elimination of com-
pensatory and punitive damages for employers who attempt, in
good faith, to provide a reasonable accommodation.'
C. Buskirk v. Apollo Metals, Inc.159
In Buskirk v. Apollo Metals, Inc.,'6 ° the Court of Appeals for the
Third Circuit revisited the issue of whether an employer is re-
quired to provide an accommodation to a "regarded as" plaintiff.
161
William Buskirk ("Buskirk") sued Apollo Metals, Inc., ("Apollo")
claiming that they discriminated against him in violation of the
ADA by regarding him as disabled, refusing to accommodate him,
and ultimately terminating him.6 Buskirk held a number of dif-
ferent jobs during his employment with Apollo.' In February
1996, when Buskirk suffered a work related back injury, he was
employed as a box maker.' He was off work for several months
and then returned to a light duty position.'65 Thereafter, Buskirk
156. Id. at 193.
157. 42 U.S.C. § 1981a(a)(3) (2003).
158. 42 U.S.C. § 1981a(a)(3) (2003).
159. 307 F.3d 160 (3d Cir. 2002).
160. Id.
161. Id. at 162
162. Id.
163. Id. at 163
164. Buskirk, 307 F.3d at 163.
165. Id.
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was advised by his physicians to cease working to rest his back."'
He did so from June of 1996 to October of 1996.167 During this pe-
riod he collected partial workers' compensation benefits. Buskirk
returned to work at Apollo in a light duty position.'68
In June of 1997, Apollo advised Buskirk that he was termi-
nated.169 Apollo explained that, in its view, Buskirk could not per-
form the job of box maker, with or without accommodation.
70
Apollo further advised Buskirk that, based upon their review of
his medical documentation, it appeared that his condition would
permanently prevent him from returning to the box maker posi-
tion. 171 Apollo concluded that, since no other vacant positions were
available which would accommodate his physical limitations, their
only alternative was to terminate him. 7' Buskirk filed suit alleg-
ing that Apollo's termination of his employment violated both the
ADA and the PHRA. 173
In Buskirk, the court observed that: "[t]he Supreme Court re-
cently has stated that the primary purpose of the ADA is to 'di-
minish or eliminate the stereotypical thought processes, the
thoughtless actions, and the hostile reactions that far too often bar
those with disabilities from participating fully in the Nation's life
including the workplace."'174 The court then articulated the test
for determining whether plaintiff has established a prima facie
case of disability discrimination. The court stated that "a plaintiff
must establish that s/he (1) has a 'disability'; (2) is a 'qualified
individual'; and (3) has suffered an adverse employment action
because of that disability."
175
The court held that Buskirk had adduced sufficient evidence to
conclude that Apollo perceived him to be disabled and had, thus,
satisfied the first prong of the analysis.'76 The court then turned
its attention to whether Buskirk was a "qualified individual."
17
This inquiry necessarily raised the issue of whether he could per-
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dation.'78 After noting that several courts of appeal had addressed
the issue of whether accommodation is required for employees who
are "regarded as" disabled, and that the Court of Appeals for the
Third Circuit had not decided the issue in either Deane or Taylor,
the court held it need not reach the issue since Apollo had accom-
modated Buskirk.'79 The court also noted that, although not
raised by Apollo, the "direct threat" defense may have been avail-
able. °1" ' The court concluded that, by providing a number of light
duty assignments, medical leaves of absence and, ultimately, plac-
ing him in a position for which he was qualified, no jury could con-
clude that Apollo failed to accommodate Buskirk.'82 The court did
not, however, express an opinion as to whether Apollo's Herculean
efforts were, in fact, required by the ADA.
III. CONCLUSION
The "regarded as" definition of "disability" in the ADA was en-
acted in order to combat the myths, fears and stereotypes of soci-
ety regarding certain impairments. As the Supreme Court noted
in Sutton, in order to state a "regarded as" claim, the employee
must prove that the employer either incorrectly believed the em-
ployee had a substantially limiting impairment or that the em-
ployer incorrectly believed that the limiting impairment the em-
ployee had was substantial. 3 In either instance, misperception on
the part of the employer as to the employee's true condition is re-
quired. But neither instance could occur if the employee had re-
quested an accommodation. If an employee requested an accom-
modation, the employer would be acting not on its own biases or
fears, but on the basis of an employee's request.
Deane, Taylor and Buskirk caution employers to act only after
engaging in the individualized inquiry the ADA requires. It fol-
lows that any employer who does so will be acing on the basis of
its good faith analysis of whether the employee's condition is pro-
tected by the ADA. Accordingly, an employer who denies a re-
quested accommodation after thoroughly analyzing the employee's
condition and job functions does not "regard" the employee as dis-
178. Id.
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abled. Rather, the employer "regards" the employee as not dis-
abled. Under these circumstances, according to the Court of Ap-
peals for the Third Circuit, there is no ADA liability. I would rec-
ommend that the Court of Appeals provide more certainty in the
employment relationship by extending its analysis to definitively
hold that there is no ADA cause of action for failure to accommo-
date an employee who is "regarded as" disabled. The only "ac-
commodation" that a "regarded as" disabled employee requires or
is entitled to under the ADA is their employer's education.
To do so would simply be to give full effect to the intent of the
"regarded as" prong of the ADA, namely, to combat the disabling
nature of discriminatory attitudes. To hold otherwise would in-
crease the likelihood that a Pennsylvania employer would deny a
request for accommodation immediately without further inquiry
since any decision to deny the accommodation on the basis the
employee was not actually disabled may lead to a claim that the
employer "regarded" the employee as disabled. By clarifying this
issue the Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit will provide a de-
finitive answer to Pennsylvania employers and employees as to
whether, in the context of reasonable accommodations under the
ADA, ignorance is actionable, or is bliss.
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